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I. INTRODUCTION 
Research and Development (R&D) is one of the most important business 
activities of the next decade (Porter, 1990). Commercialization of technological 
know how is essential for survival of firms (Teece, 1987). Organizational forms 
of R&D are one of the main competitive advantages of firms. The importance 
of cooperative agreements and networks as an alternative for in-house R&D 
is increasing (E.C., 1991; OTA, 1990). Collaborative agreements are of strategic 
importance for a firm (Hakansson, 1990). The number of international 
cooperative agreements has increased. For example, more than 30% of 
cooperative agreements in biotechnology are between companies from different 
parts of the world (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1990). Table 1 shows the 
increasing importance of cooperative agreements in biotechnology. 
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Table 1. Number of Cooperative Agreements in 
Biotechnology Industry Worldwide 
Period 
before 1974 
1975-1979 
1980-1984 
1984-1989 
Number 
11 
92 
392 
718 
Source: Hagendoom, J. & Schakenraad., "Alliances and Partnerships in 
Biotechnology and Information Technologies," MERIT, June 
1990, p. 14. 
In this article alternative organizational forms of R&D projects are analyzed. 
A framework is proposed which shows how organizational forms, governance 
structures and explanatory variables are related. By evaluating the existing 
economic and organization theories, two testable hypotheses have been 
derived. These hypotheses will be tested at the industry level with data 
concerning R&D projects of U.S. biotechnology firms. This article concludes 
with suggestions for further research. 
II. RESEARCH QUESTION 
In practice enterprises can choose different organizational forms for the 
acquisition and exploitation of technological know how. For instance, 
technological know how can be acquired through internal R&D, the 
acquisition of innovative enterprises, joint ventures, joint R&D, or by contract 
research and licensing. The exploitation of technological know how can be 
organized by internal exploitation, creation of innovative enterprises, joint 
ventures and licensing (Granstrand & Sjolander 1990). Our research question 
is "How can the organizational form of a R&D project that a firm prefers 
be explained by environmental and managerial variables?" For analytical 
purposes, we shall characterize organizational forms of R&D projects as one 
of the alternative governance structures: 'make,' 'cooperate' and 'buy' or 'sell' 
(Williamson & Ouchi, 1981). 
The above mentioned research question has been split into three steps: 
1. linking organizational forms and governance structures 
2. explaining governance structures by explanatory factors 
3. operationalization of explanatory factors by empirical variables 
Figure 1 illustrates the three steps which comprise the research question and 
the explanation of organizational forms. Organizational forms of R&D are 
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1 
step 1 
1 
Governance structure 
1 
step 2 
1 
Explanatory factors 
1 
step 3 
1 
Explanatory variables 
HYPOTHESES 
Figure 1. Steps Involved in Investigating the Research Question 
analyzed in an indirect way and attempts are made to explain the underlying 
governance structures of those organizational forms. 
III. ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS AND 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
Organizational forms of R&D projects can be classified along several lines. 
As a start the degree of organizational inter connectedness can be evaluated. 
The degree to which primary and supporting activities in the 'value chain' 
(Porter, 1986) are implemented in cooperation with a partner is considered 
(Coopers & Lybrand Dijker van Dien, 1990). Contractor and Lorange (1988) 
mention the degree of mutual dependence of related firms as a point of 
reference. The typology by Harrigan (1988) of organizational forms as joint 
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ventures organizes these forms along four key dimensions: form, focus, (degree 
of) autonomy and duration: The basic classification of organizational forms 
into 'intrafirm,' 'open market' and 'interfirm' transactions by Root (1988) are 
taken as the point of departure. The question is whether the transfer of 
technological knowledge takes place within the organizational boundaries of 
a firm, between aggregates of firms at the market place, or between firms which 
cooperate with each other. In this setting, the corresponding governance 
structures 'make,' 'buy' (or 'sell') and 'cooperate' are distinguished. The 
organizational forms of internal R&D, the acquisition of innovative 
enterprises, as well as internal exploitation and creation of innovative 
enterprises can be classified as a 'make' option. Joint R&D, joint exploitation 
and joint ventures are each examples of the 'cooperate' option. Licensing and 
contract research represent the 'buy' (or 'sell') option. It has been ascertained 
that organizational forms of R&D projects can be classified into governance 
structures. In Figure 2, the connection between organizational forms and 
governance structures is illustrated. We consider R&D as a functional 
management activity in which assets such as human capital, physical capital 
and equipment are used for transformating inputs into outputs, which can be: 
(1) technological knowledge in the form of documents, blueprints or training, 
(2) rights to use knowledge (patents, licenses) and (3) knowledge embodied 
Organizational form Governance structure 
Internalization 
- internal R&D/exploitation 
- acquisition/creation of M A K E 
innovative enterprises | 
I 
-joint ventures I 
-joint R&D C O O P E R A T E 
-joint exploitation | 
I 
- contract research B U Y 
- licensing ( S E L L ) 
I 
Externalization 
Figure 2. Organizational Forms and Governance Structures 
(Step 1 Research Question) 
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in capital equipment and (intermediate) goods. Organizational forms can be 
distinguished to the extent to which transfer of technological know how is 
supported by a transfer of assets. Consistent with Robinson (1988), 
organizational forms of R&D are distinguished by the degree to which 
transactions in technological know how are coupled with transfer of cash, 
assets, financial and management control. The more R&D is internalized, the 
more control a firm has over the assets necessary for R&D. 
IV. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The second step of the research question is linking governance structures with 
explanatory factors. Several approaches at the industry and firm level can be 
used to analyze governance structures of R&D. These include the evolutionary 
approach of Nelson & Winter (1982), resource dependence approach (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978), transaction costs approach (Williamson & Ouchi, 1981), 
agency approach (Eisenhardt, 1989, Jensen, 1983, Jensen & Meckling, 1976, 
Levinthal, 1988), appropriability approach (Teece, 1987), network approach 
(Hakansson, 1989, 1990, Jarillo, 1988), 'nexus of treaties appoach' (Aoki & 
Williamson, 1990) and contingency approach (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969, 
Rothwell & Whiston, 1990). 
The key explanatory factors in these approaches can be summarized as 
'uncertainty' and 'dependence' (Aldrich, 1979; Fahey & Narayanan, 1986; 
Lawrence & Dyer, 1983). The behavior of a firm is directed to realizing a reduction 
of uncertainty and dependence. In a similar way, the degree of internalization 
of R&D (dependent variable) can be linked with the explanatory factors 
(independent variables) 'uncertainty' and 'dependence.' In accordance with the 
transaction cost, agency and contingency approaches it is assumed that 
uncertainty of transactions in technological know how stimulates internalization 
of R&D. Corresponding with the resource dependence approach of Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) the second assumption is that R&D will be more internalized 
if a firm is more dependent on buyers of the output (technological know how) 
or sellers of inputs neccesary to perform R&D. // is concluded that the degree 
of internalization of R&D is positively related to (1) the degree of uncertainty 
of transactions in technological know how and (2) the degree of dependence of 
a firm on buyers and sellers. As was mentioned earlier, the third step of the 
research question is to operationalize the explanatory factors 'uncertainty' and 
'dependence.' Put differently: "What empirically observable variables can explain 
organizational forms of R&D projects?" 
Explanatory Factor 1: 'Uncertainty' 
With respect to this issue, Kamien & Schwartz (1982) discern three forms 
of uncertainty: total costs of a R&D project ('technological uncertainty'), the 
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possibility that a competing technology will be introduced ('market 
uncertainty1) and how much profits a new technology will contribute ('financial 
uncertainty'). However, uncertainty can be analyzed at a more fundamental 
level, namely at the level of management of R&D projects. Among other things, 
the costs which are necessary to coordinate R&D are a manifestation of the 
explanatory factor 'uncertainty.' In the agency approach, a more narrow 
definition, specifically the costs of structuring, controlling and bonding 
contracts, the so called 'agency costs,' are used. The interesting point is that 
in the agency approach the choice among several alternative contract forms 
can be explained by the explanatory factor 'uncertainty.' As Eisenhardt (1989) 
points out the length of an agency relationship is positively related to behavior 
and negatively related to outcome based contracts. The longer an agency 
relationship exists, the more control a firm wants to exert over activities 
performed by agents who act on behalf of the firm. So, based on the agency 
approach, the degree of internalization of activities is positively related to 
'uncertainty,' which in turn corresponds to the duration of activities. The first 
testable hypothesis is formulated as: 
Hypothesis I 
A firm will be more inclined to internalize R&D as the development time of 
a project (or part of a project in consideration) increases. 
Explanatory Factor 2: 'Dependence' 
A second explanatory factor is 'dependence.' Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) 
distinguish two forms of dependence: 'sales' and 'purchase dependence,' 
together indicated as 'transactions dependence.' According to these authors, 
the degree of dependence will increase if a firm buys a greater share of its inputs 
from a supplier or sells a greater share of its output to one seller. The inclination 
to internalize activities is explained by a need to reduce several forms of 
dependence. Hakansson (1989, p. 73) links the propensity of firms to cooperate 
with the so called 'resource structure,' the degree of control a company exerts 
over the resources: input goods, financial capital, personnel, technology and 
marketing. He approximates the degree of dependence on buyers by the market 
share of a firm. Empirical testing on industry level confirms the propensity 
to cooperate is negatively related to market share. Pisano (1990) proposes a 
useful indicator of the degree of dependence, namely the (inverse of the) number 
of companies with capabilities in the same application area (N), which we will 
define briefly as 'companies with similar capabilities.' We use this indicator 
as well. We assume that the degree of internalization of R&D will increase 
when dependence rises as a result of a lowering of the number of companies 
with similar capabilities (N). Therefore, the second hypothesis is: 
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Hypothesis II 
A firm will be more inclined to internalize R&D as the number of companies 
with similar capabilities (N) decreases. 
V. EMPIRICAL TESTING 
A. Introduction 
Hypotheses I and II are tested with data concerning biotechnology firms 
in the United States. In this industry, appropriate organizational forms of R&D 
projects are of primary importance due to rapid developments (Orsenigo, 1989; 
Pisano, 1990; Shan, 1990). 
B. Data 
A Dutch commercial bank (Rabobank Nederland), which specializes in (high 
risk) investments in biotechnology provided the data. The data pertains to a 
cross-section of 158 current projects in 1990 of nine U.S. biotechnology 
companies. The main activities of these companies are concentrated in the 
pharmaceutical industry. These companies all (1) have experience with R&D 
and (2) make use of appropriate distribution channels. For each project the 
stage of development, number of competing companies with capabilities in the 
same application area (N) and (eventual) type of financial agreement 
(organizational form) with possible partners is known. 
The following stages are discerned: (1) the R&D stage, (2) stage I, (3) stage 
II, (4) stage III of clinical trials and (5) approval. In the R&D stage projects 
are started. In stages I, II and III the clinical safety of a drug is tested, followed 
by large scale testing with patients. Eventually in the approval stage a drug 
is registered. All organizational forms of the cross-section concern the 
exploitation of R&D: profit sharing and joint ventures ('cooperate' option), 
royalty, royalty/production agreements and production rights agreements 
('sell' option). Other organizational forms such as distribution agreements were 
left out of consideration, because these forms concern the functional 
management activity 'marketing' only. 
C. Testing 
For analytical purposes the dependent variable 'organizational form' was 
categorized into one of the three governance structures 'make,' 'cooperate' and 
'sell.'As an indicator of the duration (DEVT) of a project the stage of a project 
is used. The earlier the stage of a project, the longer the project will take. So 
in order of decreasing duration (DEVT) (1) the R&D stage, (2) stage I, (3) 
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stage II, (4) stage III of clinical trials and (5) the approval stage are discerned. 
As mentioned before, the number of competitors is used as a proxy for the 
number of companies with capabilities in the same application area (N). 
In Tables 2 and 3 below the frequency of governance structures are taken 
on the one hand (dependent variable) and on the other hand the stage of 
development (Table 2) and number of competitors (Table 3) as explanatory 
variables. 
Table 2 shows that there is greater inclination to prefer the 'make' rather 
than 'cooperate' or 'sell' option in the earlier stage of a project. An X -test 
indicates there is a significant difference between the shares of the several types 
of governance structures in several stages of projects. As we have put forward, 
the earlier the stage of development, the longer a project will take. So 
internalization of R&D and duration (DEVT) of a project can be associated 
positively. In Table 3 an increase in the number of competitors (N) is linked 
with an inclination to prefer the 'sell' option rather than the 'cooperate' or 
'make' option. An X2-test confirms that the preferred types of governance 
structures differ significantly when the number of competitors (N) increases. 
Our empirical testing with data from U.S. biotechnology firms shows that 
hypotheses I and II can be supported with data from current projects of 
biotechnology firms. Of course, before generalizing these results, further testing 
is needed. 
Analysis of organizational forms at the firm level can be a useful extension 
of the analysis. We take one of the firms in the above mentioned sample, the 
U.S. firm Genetics Institute (G.I.), as an example. G.I. develops products for 
curing heart, vessel, blood diseases, and cancer. G.I. is a fast growing research 
intensive firm with 520 employees. During the period 1985-1989 total revenues 
grew annually by 30% to approximately $43 million in 1989 (Paine Webber, 
1990). It appears that international agreements with foreign firms are of 
strategic importance for the exploitation of technological know how. Three-
quarters of the number of new products of G.I. are commercialized by 
international agreements with European and Japanese firms (Rabobank, 
1990). Products in stage III of clinical trials or the approval stage have a 
relatively short development time. It was observed that for the commercial-
ization of those products, license or license/production agreements are 
preferred. Whereas one product at the development stage, characterized by 
a relatively long development time, is developed by ajoint venture with another 
foreign company. At firm level internalization of exploitation of R&D and 
the development time of a new product are associated positively. A next step, 
analysis of the evolution of organizational forms at project level, is an 
interesting field for future research. 
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Table 2. Stage of R&D Project and Governance Structure 
stage 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
total 
'make' 
25 
11 
7 
5 
1 
49 
Governance Structure 
'cooperate' 
5 
6 
0 
0 
1 
12 
•sett' 
4 
11 
8 
12 
10 
45 
total 
34 
28 
15 
17 
12 
106 
Note: X" = 33,04 (12 degrees of freedom); p < 0,001. 
Source: Rabobank Nederland, 1990. 
Table 3. Number of Competitors and Governance Structure 
number 
0 
1 
2 
3-6 
total 
'make' 
36 
7 
9 
7 
59 
Governance Structure 
'cooperate' 
9 
2 
I 
0 
12 
'sell' 
23 
10 
8 
16 
57 
total 
68 
19 
18 
23 
128 
Note: X2 = 23,98 (6 degrees of freedom); p < 0,001. 
Source; Rabobank Nederland, 1990. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has tried to explain organizational forms of R&D projects. 
Organizational forms, governance structures and explanatory variables have 
been linked. It is hypothesized that the inclination of firms to internalize R&D 
is positively associated with the length of the development time (DEVT) and 
negatively associated with the number of firms with capabilities in the same 
application area (N). 
Several issues deserve closer attention. First, as noted by Lawrence & Lorsch 
(1969), the integration between the functional management activities of R&D, 
production and marketing deserve special attention. This will be a managerial 
challenge. Second, the dynamics of organizational forms at industry, firm and 
project level is an interesting field of research in the future (Killing, 1985, 
Moenaert et al., 1990). In our view the time element of the explanatory factor 
'dependence' should be taken into consideration. Third, further analysis of the 
characteristics of networks for diffusion of technological knowledge at the 
industry and firm level in an international competitive environment is an 
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interesting field of future research. As Hakansson (1990) notes the appropriate 
organizational form for commercialization of R&D in international business 
networks is a managerial issue of strategic importance. 
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